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The Trigger Price Mechanism:
Limitation on Administrative Discretion
under the Antidumping Laws

The world steel market, Jong subject to cyclical fluctuations, is presently faced with a severe problem of overproduction. United States producers of steel in particular have suffered difficulties in the current crisis. 1
While the industry's problems are not new, conditions of slack demand
and overcapacity have recently resulted in the implementation of a new
system to administer the antidumping Jaws of the United States to curb
imports of foreign-produced steel. This article will describe and evaluate
this new system, the trigger price mechanism (TPM), and consider its role
as a constraint on the administrative discretion of the United States Department of the Treasury.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY

World raw steel production has grown rapidly in the postwar years, rising from a total of approximately 207 million net tons in 1950 to 783 million net tons in 1974. At the same time, the share of production attributable to United States producers has steadily eroded from forty-seven percent to seventeen percent. 2 While steel making capacity is dispersed
throughout the world, production remains concentrated in the more developed economies. The USSR, the United States, the European Communities (EC), and Japan produce about three-fourths of the world's raw
steel. 3
Domestic consumers are the dominant purchasers of United Statesproduced steel. Because of the size of the American market, however,
this country has been a target of exports by foreign producers. 4 Imports of

'N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1977, at 51, col. 4.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE UNITED STATES STEEL INDUSTRY AND ITS INTERNATIONAL RIVALS: TRENDS AND FACTORS DETERMINING INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 5-6 (Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FTC STAFF REPORT).
3
The United States accounted for approximately one-half of the total world steel production in 1950, but only about one-sixth in 1976. In that year, the U.S.S.R. produced 147 million metric tons of raw steel, followed by the United States with production of 116 million
tons, and Japan with 107 million metric tons. The countries of the European Communities
(EC), together, produced 134 million metric tons of steel. Id. at 6-8. From 1955 to 1976, raw
steel production increased by only 9% in the United States, compared to 84% in the EC and
1,038% in Japan. THE COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRICES AND COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES STEEL INDUSTRY 8 (Nov. 1977) [hereinafter cited as COWPS REPORT).
•FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
2
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raw steel rose from 1.5 percent of apparent United States consumption of
steel in 1957 to almost eighteen percent in 1977. 5 Over the same time
period, American industry employment fell from more than 500,000
hourly workers to fewer than 370,000. 6 Moreover, domestic production
has grown at a far smaller rate than the world average. 7 Clearly, the United States steel industry is undergoing a relative contraction. This conclusion does not prove, however, that these economic dislocations have
been caused by anything more than normal competitive processes.
There are several possible explanations of the difficulties faced by the
United States steel industry. Critical observers of the industry, after examining the historical increase in steel imports, argue that the continuing
loss of domestic market share is due to the relative efficiency of foreign
steelmakers and the willingness of foreign steel exporters to price in a
flexible manner. 8 It is also claimed that poor management of United
States steel producers has contributed to this erosion of market share. 9
This line of reasoning suggests that increased imports are a reflection of
worldwide price competition and will bring positive benefits to American
consumers.
Management and labor union spokesmen contend, however, that the
steel industry's problems are the result of both excessive federal regulation and unfair international trade practices, principally dumping. 10
Dumping is the sale in the United States of foreign products below "fair
value," normally measured by the home market prices of the exporting
producer, which injures or is likely to injure a domestic industry . 11
Domestic steel firms have filed an unprecedented number of petitions 12
under the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended, 13 asking for relief from

5
See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 70 (Table 2.24: Growth Trends in Production,
Shipments, Imports and Exports of Steel Mill Products: 1950-1976), and INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM FOR THE STEEL
INDUSTRY 9 (December 6, I 977) [hereinafter cited as Solomon Report], [reprinted in Administration's Comprehensive Program For The Steel Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-38 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The negotiation of Voluntary Restraint Agreements (VRA) with
the major Japanese and EC steel producers for tonnage limits on exports from 1969 through
1974, discussed in Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975), renders these numbers inadequate for determining
the potential foreign penetration of the U.S. market.
"Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 3.
7
FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
"Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 10.
"But see FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 472-512, and particularly the conclusions at
528-30.
10
Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 10.
"See text accompanying notes 21-39 infra for a fuller discussion of the statutory elements
of an antidumping violation.
12
See, e.g., notices of Treasury Department investigations, prompted by petition, covering carbon steel plate from Japan, 42 Fed. Reg. 16,883 (Mar. 30, 1977), welded stainless steel
pipe and tubing from Japan, 42 Fed. Reg. 16,883 (Mar. 30, 1977), steel wire strand for prestressed concrete from Japan, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,034 (Nov. 23, 1977), and cold rolled and galvanized carbon steel sheets from Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,348-54 (Dec. 2, 1977).
3
' 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-172 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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these practices. They contend that the dramatic surge in imports, from
14.3 percent in 1976 to almost eighteen percent in 1977 14 cannot be explained as a competitive response to market conditions, since growth of
United States demand for steel and United States prices have increased
only gradually. Further, they argue that maintenance of full employment
in Western Europe and Japan is considered a fundamental social policy. 15
Consequently, unlike the United States where labor lay-offs and contractions are more common, labor in the EC and Japan is a fixed cost of production. When overcapacity and slack demand press upon foreign steel
firms, their response allegedly is to find additional markets 16 by selling
below average production costs, thereby leading U.S. purchasers to
switch to foreign producers of steel. The result of this dumping is to shift
the unemployment burden from foreign firms to United States steel
firms. 17
The antidumping laws may be employed to protect consumers against a
loss in economic welfare as well as to shield American industries by erecting protective barriers to imports. Dumping by a foreign producer can
harm consumers in two circumstances. The first of these is monopolization of the import market by a foreign concern through predatory pricing, 18 and the second is temporary exportation of products at below cost
by the foreign firm to maintain production and employment at home. 19 In
either case, artificially low prices may force domestic producers out of
business and may reduce the available supply of the product to consumers
over the long run. 20

II.

UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING LAW

The Antidumping Act of 1921, 21 administered by the Treasury Department, has provided the primary basis for the American response to the
recent increase in steel imports. 22 In proscribing dumping, the Act authorizes the imposition of customs duties equal to the margin of dumping
found upon final determination that the law has been violated. 23 The

FfC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 70 and Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 9.
See, e.g., Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett, Inc;, Economics of International Steel Trade: Policy Implications for the United States 16 (May 1977) (report to the American Iron and Steel
Institute).
16/d. at 18.
17
See, e.g.,Hearings, supra note 5, at 226 (Statement of Hon. Ralph Regula).
18 See W. Wares, An Evaluation of the Provisions and Recent Administrative History of
the United States Antidumping Act of 1921, at 190-95 (1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation
in the University of Michigan Economics Department).
19
/d. at 183-90.
20
If supply is restricted while consumer demand remains unrestrained, it is evident that
purchasers will be forced to pay higher prices for the product.
21
19 U.S.C. §§ 160-172 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Act was extensively amended by
§ 321 of the 1974 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (Jan. 3, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as 1974 Trade Act].
22
Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 4. See also note 12 supra.
23
19 u.s.c. § 161 (1970).
14

15
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Treasury Department, at its discretion, may initiate an antidumping investigation. 24 When complaints are initiated by private parties, however, it
must determine within thirty days whether to begin an investigation. 25
Once an investigation is undertaken, the Treasury Department must determine if sales of the foreign-produced good in U.S. markets are at "less
than fair value" (LTFV). 26 In making this evaluation, the Treasury compares the "purchase price" or "exporter's sales price" with one of three
standards measuring foreign value. The difference constitutes the "margin of dumping. " 27 When the U.S. importer and the foreign exporter are
unrelated, the Antidumping Act requires the Treasury to rely for its calculations on the "purchase price," defined as the price at which the importer purchased the merchandise plus any other costs normally included in
the factory price. 28 If the U.S. importer is commercially related to the
foreign exporter, the Act substitutes a determination of the "exporter's
sales price" as the appropriate standard. This is essentially the price at
which the American importer resells the article in the domestic market,
adjusted to arrive at a calculated net f.o.b. factory price. 29
Once the purchase or exporter's sales price has been calculated, it is
compared against one of three standards of foreign value. In calculating
the foreign market value of American imports, the Treasury is directed to
use the home-market price of that good whenever possible. 30 If the
home-market price cannot be ascertained, foreign market value is computed from the price of goods exported to third-party countries. 31 Where
home-market and third-party prices are less than the exporter's cost of
production, the Treasury uses a "constructed value" in conducting antidumping inquiries. 32 "Constructed value" is the sum of the costs of
materials, fabrication and processing, packing, and general expenses and
profits. The statute mandates minimum levels for general expenses and
profits of 10 percent and 8 percent, respectively, of the cost of materials,
fabrication and processing. 33 Upon determination of the foreign market
value, the Treasury compares it with the purchase or exporter's sale price
to arrive at the margin of dumping.
The Treasury is required to issue a Tentative Determination within nine
months after a full-scale investigation has begun. 34 If the Tentative Determination indicates that sales L TFV are likely to be found, the Treasury
must suspend customs value appraisal on the merchandise in question. 35

24

19 U.S.C.
19 U.S.C.
26 19 U.S.C.
27 19 u.s.c.
28 19 U.S.C.
29 19 U.S.C.
30 19 U.S.C.
25

§
§
§
§
§
§
§

160(a) (Supp. V 1975).
160(c)(l) (Supp. V 1975).
160(a) (Supp. V 1975).
161 (1970).
162 (Supp. V 1975).
163 (Supp. V 1975).
164(a) (Supp. V 1975).

31/d.
32

19 U.S.C. §
19 U .S.C. §
34 19 U.S.C. §
35
19 U .S.C. §

33

164(b) (Supp. V 1975).
165(a) (1970).
160(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
160 (b)(l)(b) (Supp. V 1975). Customs appraisal is the practice of assessing
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Such merchandise may thereafter be imported only if covered by a bond
equal to the tentative margin of dumping. 36 Following publication of the
Tentative Determination, all interested parties may make written and oral
representations before a Final Determination is announced. 37 If theFinal
Determination, which must be made within 90 days of the Tentative Determination, is affirmative, the case is referred to the U.S. International
Trade Commission (ITC) to determine whether the LTFV sales have
caused or are likely to cause injury to a domestic industry. 38 If the ITC
finds such irtjury, the Treasury publishes a dumping finding and assesses
antidumping duties equal to the final margin of dumping on all imports as
to which appraisal was withheld and on all further imports of the product
sold at dumping margins. 39 The entire administrative process generally
consumes thirt~en months. 40 The prospect of judicial review, which may
focus on only the LTFV determination, further extends this time period.
Ill.

INADEQUACIES OF THE ANTIDUMPING ACT

The existing scheme for enforcing the Antidumping Act suffers from
three primary deficiencies: the cumbersome nature of the procedure, the
specific product orientation of investigations and remedies, and the
Treasury's unbridled investigatory discretion. Commentary on the insufficiency of antidumping provisions has focused on the time consuming aspect of the procedure. 41 Enforcement procedures, from drafting of the
complaint through imposition of a dumping duty, require sixteen to seventeen months to complete. 42 Judicial intervention after completion of administrative action may further delay final relief. Consequently, sudden
surges of "dumped" imports can entirely evade action by the Treasury.
Where dumping is predicated on short-term exporting designed to maintain production and employment, the practical inability to reach temporary conduct may render the Act ineffective. 43
the value of an article for the purpose of computing an ad valorem tariff on importing the
article.
36
19 C.F.R. §§ 153. 50-153.51 (1977). The effect of requiring that bond be posted has been
described as potentially "devastating." Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the United States:
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 LAW & PoL. INT'L Bus. 85, 96 (1973).
37
19 U.S.C. § 160(d)(I) (Supp. V 1975). Prior to the 1974 Trade Act revision,
§ 32l(a)(2)(d)(l), opportunity to make a presentation was at the discretion of the Secretary
of the Treasury. See Fisher, supra note 36, at 96.
38
19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (Supp. V 1975).
39
19 U.S.C. §§ 160(a), 161 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
0
• Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 12.
0
See Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 12.
2
• This estimate includes the time necessary for preparation of a complaint. Transcript of
Department of the Treasury Press Conference by Robert W. Crandall and Peter D.
Ehrenhaft at 25-26 (Jan. 3, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Treasury Press Conference]:
Question: How long is it likely to take American producers to follow a dumping
case all the way through the ITC and to the end?
Mr. Ehrenhaft: The average time today is 13 months following the filing of the
complaint, but if you add to that the time that it takes to prepare the complaints,
probably it takes 16, 17 months. This is intended to compress that significantly.
43
Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 12.
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Unfair product sales designed to monopolize the import market must
occur on a continuing basis, however, and therefore would seem to be
within the reach of enforcement efforts. The problem remains, nevertheless, because antidumping investigations and remedies concentrate on
specific products. Complaints may be brought only with respect to
specific types of merchandise, and only specific products are subject to
the Act's remedies. 44 Foreign producers intent on continuing unlawful
imports can easily shift to a related product which is outside the scope of
the investigation and persist in unfair price discrimination between national markets. 45 Only recently have domestic steel producers attempted
to combat this practice by filing a battery of antidumping petitions covering a broad range of steel products.
The Treasury also has been criticized for exercising its discretion in initiating investigations to avoid antagonizing foreign governments. Until
the advent of the 1974 amendments, it is alleged, the Treasury consistently refused to press antidumping investigations that might affect sensitive trade relations with other countries. 46 While this exercise of discretion was circumscribed by the introduction of maximum time limits on
procedural steps in 1974, including a requirement that the Treasury either
begin an investigation or refuse to do so within thirty days of receiving a
complaint, 47 the discretion of the Treasury to initiate and carry through to
completion antidumping prosecutiol!s remains relatively unhampered. 48
The strong response of domestic steel producers to the influx of imports
into the American market, including the filing of numerous antidumping
complaints, led to the formation of an Interagency Task Force on Steel by
the Carter Administration in late 1977. In the report by the Task Force to
the President, 49 popularly known as the Solomon Report, a policy program for relief of the United States steel industry was developed. While
the Solomon Report recommends a series of measures to deal with long
term problems of the industry, including modernization and environmental regulation, 50 the centerpiece of the program is a system of trigger

44
19 U.S.C.§§ 160(a) and 16l(a) authorize imposition of dumping duties only on those
products subject to a specific investigation. The Treasury Department may not, for example,
impose dumping duties on steel wire based on an affirmative finding of dumping with respect
to steel tubin$, Consequently, the Department must investigate both products. See the
notices of antldumping investigations m 42 Fed. Reg. 60,034 (Nov. 23, 1977) (steel wire
strand for prestressed concrete) and 42 Fed. Reg. 16,883 (Mar. 30, 1977) (steel pipe and tubing), as an example of investigations into related products.
45
Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 13.
46
Samuelson, The Anti-Dumping Laws-Rx for the Steel Industry, 9 NAT'L J. 1636, 1637
(1977).
47
1974 Trade Act, § 32l(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. V 1975).
48
The 1974 amendments set maximum time limits on the various procedural seps in a
Treasury Department investigation, provide for notice through publication of all major
Treasury actions, and provide an opportunity for manufacturers, importers and exporters to
demand a hearing prior to a Final Determination. See 1974 Trade Act,§ 321(a), 19 U.S.C.
§ 160 (Supp. V 1975).
49
Solomon Report, supra note 5.
50
The Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 21-35, proposed, inter a/ia, reducing the
guidelines for useful life depreciation of new steel industry machinery and equipment under
I.R.C. § 167(m) from 18 to 15 years, additional funds be made available for industrial loan
guarantees, providing funds for assistance to individuals, business and public services in
communities hit hard by steel-related unemployment, and support for conversion of aban-
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prices for monitoring steel import prices and for initiating antidumping investigations. 51 Acting under the authority of Section 20l(a) of the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended, 52 the Treasury Department implemented the trigger price system recommended in the Solomon Report. sa
IV.

THE TRIGGER PRICE SYSTEM

A. Operation of the TPM

The TPM consists of four parts: 54
(1) the identification and publication of trigger prices for steel
products imported in the United States;
(2) the adoption of a special Summary Steel Invoice for use by
the Customs Service in administering the trigger price system;
(3) the continuous collection and analysis of information on the
cost of production and the prices of steel products in the principal countries of export for use in calculating the trigger prices,
and information on the condition of the United States steel industry; and
(4) the expedited administration of antidumping proceedings for
imports below the levels set by the trigger prices.

The system, as discussed below, is a self-imposed restraint on the Treasury Department's discretion to initiate enforcement activities under the
Antidumping Act. This restraint on investigatory and prosecutorial discretion is accompanied by public guidelines, the trigger prices themselves, which place foreign producers on notice as to how the Treasury
will exercise its discretion in targeting steel imports for investigation.
The trigger prices are calculated from the estimated cost of steel production in the most efficient exporting country, currently Japan, based on
the best evidence available. 55 Profit and general expense factors, as well
as appropriate capital charges, are incorporated in the cost of production.

doned steel facilities into alternative uses. In the area of environmental regulation, the Report urged better coordination between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and a continuing dialogue with the steel industry.
51
Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 13-20.
52
19 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. V 1975).
53
43 Fed. Reg. 1464 (Jan. 9, 1978).
54
42 Fed. Reg. 65,214, 65,215 (Dec. 30, 1977) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Part 141) (Proposed Amendments to the Customs Regulations Relating to the Documents and Information
Required to be Filed at the Time of Importation of Certain Articles of Steel).
55
ln the course of publishing the base prices for certain imports of steel mill products, 43
Fed. Reg. 1464 (Jan. 9, 1978), the Treasury Department discussed at length the methodology
it used for constructing the trigger prices. The methodology is similar to that used in the
COWPS Report, supra note 3, but the product coverage is different. In addition, the estimated costs of production constructed for use in the TPM are based primarily on information from the large, integrated Japanese steelmakers. This date was supplied to the Treasury
by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The CO WPS REPORT conclusions are based on average cost data for the Japanese steel industry as a whole. 43 Fed. Reg.
at 1464.
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Importation costs, excluding tariffs, are then added to the calculated cost
of production to arrive at the Treasury trigger price. Trigger prices have
been established for a number of specified categories of raw steel products, but fabricated steel articles are not covered by the system. 56
Imports below the level of the trigger price are subject to an antidumping investigation conducted by the Treasury. 57 Because the information
used in constructing the trigger prices will be used in steel antidumping
investigations, the Solomon Report contemplates an expedited investigation. Whereas de novo examinations take thirteen months or more, the
Report suggests that the Treasury will complete most steel cases identified by the TPM within ninety days. 58 Once a Tentative Determination
of dumping has been reached, withholding of appraisal may be imposed
retroactively under existing authority. 59 Upon a Final Determination, the
case is referred to the ITC for what the Task Force clearly hoped will be a
similarly expedited injury determination. 60
The TPM is in form exclusively a procedure allowing the Treasury Department to initiate and expedite an investigation, without the impetus of
a private industry petition, into sales of foreign steel products which may
have been made at an LTFV price. The trigger price system merely identifies those cases in which the Treasury will initiate an investigation, and
since such self-initiation is presently a matter of de facto administrative
discretion, 61 the implementation of the system does not affect the legal
rights of private parties under the Antidumping Act. 62 Foreign firms, of
course, may still contest an LTFV determination by the Treasury. 63
Where the Treasury does not initiate an investigation because the merchandise in question entered the United States at a price above the relevant trigger, domestic firms may file a complaint with the Treasury requesting an investigation. 64 In such cases, where sales at LTFV have occurred but are above the trigger price, the domestic firm is likely to encounter difficulty in proving the requisite "injury" before the ITC. 65 In
proposing the trigger system, the Solomon Report accepted the United
States industry position that domestic firms are fully competitive with·
foreign producers where sales are not made below the actual cost of pro-

56
See U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, Trigger Price Mechanism:
Questions and Answers, Attachment 3 (Feb. 10, 1978). Domestic steel fabricatoi:s are expected to seek trigger pricing protection. The Opposition Grows to Reference Pricing.Bus.
WEEK, April 10, 1978 at 30. The program included 17 steel mill products when it was first set
up, but has since swollen to 84 products. Tarnished Shield: 'Trigger-Price' System to Help
Steel Industry Triggers Much Dismay, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1978, at l, 19 col. I.
57
See Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 16.
58Jd.
59 Authority for retroactive withholding of appraisal currently exists under 19 C.F.R.
§ 153.34(a) (1977).
0
• solomon Report, supra note 5, at 16.
"'See note 24 and accompanying text, supra.
62
Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 14. The point is reemphasized in 43 Fed. Reg. 1464,
1468 (Jan. 9,1978).
63
19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1970).
64
19 u.s.c. § 1516 (Supp. V 1975).
65 See Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 18.
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duction for the most efficient Japanese steel makers. So Jong as steel
prices remain at or above this level, the United States industry position is
that domestic products are capable of meeting international competition.
Following that argument to its conclusion, it is clear that sales by a foreign
producer, which are below that firm's cost of production but above the
cost of production for the most efficient Japanese firms presently employed as a base for the trigger prices, will not be found by the ITC to
have injured the domestic industry. 66 In drafting the TPM, the Task Force
contemplated that steel antidumping cases not initiated by the Treasury
under the new system would be a waste of both public and private resources. Consequently, steel producers who are Jess efficient than the
Japanese, such as the Western European concerns, will be effectively insulated from prosecution under the Antidumping Act. 67
B. TPM as Administrative Rulemaking:
Procedural Requirements and Judicial
Review

In administering the Antidurnping Act, the Treasury was faced with a
choice between establishing a pattern of enforcement emerging out of a
succession of investigations and determinations, and creating a bright-line
standard of behavior embodied in specific trigger prices. By adopting the
TPM, the Treasury effectively promulgated a "rule" governing its discretion, primarily to ensure a solution to the three problems of the statutory
enforcement scheme noted above. The procedure should become Jess
cumbersome, since use of data collected as part of the procedure for
maintaining the trigger prices will replace the prior time-consuming,
case-by-case collection of data. 68 By establishing a series of prices cover-

""See Treasury Press Conference, supra note 42, at 20.21; Transcript of White House
Briefing by Anthony M. Solomon, Under-Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs 4
(Dec. 6, 1977).
67
0n December 2, 1977, the Treasury published notices of initiation of antidumping investigations into cold rolled and galvanized carbon steel sheets produced in the major EC countries. 42 Fed. Reg. 61,348-54 (Dec, 2, 1977). On June 8 of the following year, the Treasury
announced that an L TFV determination as to these imports "cannot reasonably be made in
six months" and extended its investigatory period for an additional three months pursuant to
§ 20J(b)(2) of the 1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § J60(b)(2). 43 Fed. Reg. 24,933 (June 8, 1978).
By way of comparison, the Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 16, contemplated a 90-day
investigatory period. Finally, on August 15 the petitioner withdrew its request for an investigation and the investigation was terminated without prejudice. 43 Fed. Reg. 37 ,052 (August
21, 1978).
68
Cf. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415. U.S. 951 (1974), where the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the authority of the FTC to promulgate Trade Regulation Rules giving greater specificity to
the statutory standard of conduct proscribing "unfair methods of competition in commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." As Judge J. Skelly Wright, speaking
for the majority, noted:

Without the rule, the Commission might well be obliged to prove and argue [that
the same activity] in each particular case was likely to have injurious and unfair
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ing a broad spectrum of products, the Treasury also expects to prevent
evasion of antidumping enforcement by foreign enterprises which previously switched to unscrutinized products when appraised of an antidumping investigation. 69 Finally, by promulgating and publishing the trigger
prices, the Treasury circumscribes its own investigatory and prosecutorial .discretion. 70
The analogy between the TPM and regulatory rules, however, is incomplete in two respects. 71 In the first place, promulgation of the
mechanism by the Treasury did not include the usual procedural requirements for rulemaking 72 because the TPM was considered exempt from the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). In addition to
falling within the express foreign affairs exemption to the APA, 73 the trigger price system was exempted from the APA because it was promulgated
under a finding of' 'good cause ... that notice and public procedure ...
are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. " 74 The
basis for this finding by the Treasury is, however, questionable. While
expediting implementation of the TPM may be a laudable goal, it cannot
successfully be distinguished from similar goals in a wide variety of government programs clearly subject to APA procedures. Indeed, the only

effects on consumers or competition. Since this laborious process might well have
to be repeated every time the Commission chose to proceed subsequently against
another defendant on the same ground, the difference in administrative efficiency
between the two kinds of proceedings is obvious. Furthermore, rules, as contrasted
with the holdings reached by case-by-case adjudication, are more specific as to
their scope, and industry compliance is more likely simply because each company
is on clearer notice whether or not specific rules apply to it.
482 F.2d at 690-91. On the basis of determining that the use of rules, as opposed to case-bycase adjudication, reduced delay significantly, Judge Wright further concluded that the use
of rules minimizes the "opportunity to tum litigation into a profitable and lengthy game."
Id. at 691. As noted previously, one of the major criticisms of enforcement of the Antidumping Act has been the long delay between violation and remedy. See text accompanying notes
41-43 supra.
69
The system chosen by the Treasury does not preclude a switch from raw steel products
to fabricated steel products. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 186, 187 (Testimony of John H.
Lyons, General President, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental
Iron Workers) and text accompanying note 130 infra.
10
See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY l ll-16 (1969) [hereinafter cited as DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE) and text accompanying notes 149-157 infra.
71
Both elements, the opportunity to be heard and the right to judicial review, discussed at
text accompanying notes 72-76 irifra, were taken by Judge Wright to be important protections against the arbitrary exercise of rulemaking in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v.
FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
72
Administrative Procedure Act,§ 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
73
Section 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970), provides in pertinentpart: "(a) This section
applies according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that there is involved--(!) a.
military or foreign affairs function of the United States." For a critical discussion of this
exemption, see Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rulemaking under the APA,
71 MICH. L. REV. 221 (1972).
74
APA § 4(a) 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B). Invocation of the "good cause exemption, however, requires that the finding of good cause and a brief statement of reasons be incorporated
in the rules issue. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 139 (3d ed. 1972). The Treasury Department finding, 43 Fed. Reg. 6065 (Feb. 13, 1978), is a seven-line conclusory statement which may not meet the intent behind the requirement of a finding.
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rationale for swift initiation of the TPM is the exigencies of international
trade disputes, and it is on this ground that the foreign affairs exemption is
based. 75
Because the effectiveness of the TPM depends on the prices at which
the triggers are set, public participation in agency decisionmaking on this
issue is of signal importance. Although the Treasury provided notice and
an opportunity for comment by interested parties in advance of the TPM's
implementation, 76 it did not provide for public participation prior to announcing the methodology for calculating the trigger prices and the prices
themselves. 77 The effectiveness of the TPM in regulating steel imports
will, of course, depend on the accuracy with which the prices are calculated. While the concept of the TPM may have received formal public
scrutiny, its implementation has not, suggesting that the APA's goal of
effective public participation in agency decisionmaking may not have
been realized by Treasury procedures. 78
There is a second, and more significant difference between the TPM
and regulatory rules. Final agency actions, including rules, are subject to
judicial review in the absence of an expression of contrary congressional
purpose. 79 The promulgation of the TPM, by contrast, may be insulated
from review prior to enforcement. The TPM is designed not to affect the
legal rights of any party under the Antidumping Act but rather to constrain the Treasury's decisions to initiate investigations. The exercise of
discretionary authority to decline to investigate is traditionally protected
against judicial review ,80 and has in fact not yet been subjected to review
in antidumping cases. 81 If a discretionary refusal to investigate is unre-

75

See note 73 supra.
See 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214 (Dec. 30, 1977) (Proposed Amendments to the Customs Regulations Relating to the Documents and Information to be Filed at the Time of Importation of
Certain Articles of Steel).
11
See 43 Fed. Reg. 1464, 1469 (Jan. 9, 1978) and 43 Fed. Reg. 4703 (Feb. 3, 1978), in which
methodology and particular prices were announced without prior comment by interested
parties.
78
ln discussing whether reviewing courts should require notice and comment procedure
for rulemaking exempt from the APA, Davis argues that the courts should undertake this
function where the impact of administrative action is "substantial." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 193-202 (1976). Because the TPM reallocates economic
opportunity among interested parties, the use of a notice and comment procedure by the
Treasury would meet this policy interest in ensuring fairness of administrative actions. See
text accompanying notes 124-131 supra.
79
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
8 °K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 518 (3d ed. 1972). The principle ofunreviewability is strongest in the area of criminal law, see, e.g., Newman v. U.S., 382 F.2d 479 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.), but is slowly being replaced by judicial protection against abuse of
prosecutorial discretion in civil cases. See De Vito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1969)
(requiring the Secretary of Labor to furnish a written statement of reasons for refusing to
initiate a proceeding to set aside the results of a contested union election.) Davis argues
strongly that the judiciary should review the exercise of executive discretion to check
abuses. DAVIS, supra note 78, at 518-23. See also, Wright, Review: Beyond Discretionary
Justice, 81 YALE L. J. 575 (1972).
81
But cf. National Milk Producers Federation v. Shultz, 372 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1974)
(authorizing district court jurisdiction of a mandamus action against the Secretary of the
Treasury for failing to initiate a countervailing duty investigation, and noting that mandamus
will lie only where a duty to act is shown). Countervailing duty actions and antidumping
16
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viewable, then it necessarily follows that internal criteria for exercising
that discretion are equally insulated without regard to whether they have
been published or subject to public scrutiny. In Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 82 however, the Supreme Court noted that judicial review is presumed available under the APA to one "suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute," so long as review is not precluded by
statute or the action is not committed by law to agency discretion. 83
A strong argument may be made that judicial review of antidumping actions is limited by statute solely to scrutiny of LTFV determinations and
does not extend to the bases for investigations. In authorizing domestic
producers to challenge Negative Final Determinations in court in the 1974
Trade Act, 84 Congress stated that it was extending domestic producers
rights equal to those already held by foreign producers. 85 The subject of
such judicial review is explicitly limited to "a determination by the Secretary ... that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is not being, nor likely
to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair val~e. " 86 and therefore
does not seem to include administrative actions short of such an L TFV
determination.
The· 1974 congressional enactments on judicial review in antidumping
cases were in response to the 1971 Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA) decision in United States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc. 81 In
Hammond Lead, the CCPA reversed a decision of the Customs Court
sustaining a protest under the countervailing duty laws by an American
manufacturer of litharge, a lead oxide used in storage batteries. The
manufacturer had filed a complaint asserting that the government of
Mexico was subsidizing the export of litharge to the United States 88 in
contravention of the proscription against "any bounty or grant upon the
manufacture or production or export of any article. " 89 The Commissioner
of Customs, acting for the Treasury, declined to impose a countervailing
duty on Mexican litharge, whereupon the manufacturer brought suit in the
United States Customs Court under section 516(b) of the Tariff Act of
1930. 90 The Customs Court found that jurisdiction existed to hear the protest91 and sustained the manufacturer's protest on the merits. 92
The CCPA reversed, holding that the Customs Court lacked the right to
review an American manufacturer's protest of a negative countervailing
actions are both reviewable under the same statutol)' provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975).
82
387 U.S. 136 (1967).
83/d. at 140.
84
1974 Trade Act,§ 321(0(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (Supp. V 1975).
85
S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 178, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & Ao.
NEWS 7186, 7314-15.
86
1974 Trade Act,§ 321(0(l)(d)(l), 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d)(l) (Supp. V 1975).
87
440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
88
/d. at 1025.
89
TarifI Act of 1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
90
440 F.2d at 1025.
91
61 Cust. Ct. 137, C.D. 3552 (1968).
92
63 Cust. Ct. 316, C.D. 3915 (1969).
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duty determination under section 516. 93 Because antidumping and countervailing duty determinations were and are reviewable under the same
statutory sections, the decision implied the denial of review of negative
antidumping determinations as well. Despite an opinion prepared by the
General Counsel of the Treasury Department contending that review of
negative antidumping determinations was still available in spite of Hammond Lead, the Congress approved legislation confirming this right on
the ground that "the law ought to be specific on this point. " 94 The congressional purpose in enacting the 1974 provisions on judicial review was
therefore to overrule Hammond Lead in the area of countervailing duties
and to confirm its inapplicability to negative antidumping determinations.
The history of the 1974 Trade Act thus appears to evidence a congressional intent to confirm judicial review of LTFV determinations, both
positive and negative, but does not indicate a desire to subject administrative actions short of an L TFV determination to judicial scrutiny.
The language of the Antidumping Act, while placing limits on administrative enforcement, does not explicitly state that enforcement is committed by law to agency discretion. As the Supreme Court has explained in
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 95 in the absence of an express prohibition of judicial review, a federal agency will bear "the heavy burden of overcoming
the strong presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial
·
review of [its] decision. " 96
In the face of this strong presumption of review ability, it is unlikely that
the courts will find the Treasury's decision to refrain from investigation to
be discretionary and free from review. Moreover, review ability of preenforcement administrative action is not limited to a choice between a
mandatory duty to investigate and unreviewable discretion to refuse. Judicial scrutiny may extend to questions of whether the administrative decision was arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with
law. 97 In the course of its decision, the Abbou court cited legislative history of the APA for the standard precluding pre-enforcement review: "A
statute, if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face give
clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it. " 98 While the
preceding analysis of the legislative history argues against preenforcement reviewability of the TPM, the Abbott standard of clear and
convincing evidence may prove too heavy a burden of persuasion, and
invite a reviewing court to examine the TPM when faced with allegations
of arbitrary exercise of discretion.
93
440 F.2d at 1027, 1030-31. The CCPA was clearly influenced by its determination that
assessment of countervailing duties "necessarily involves judgments in the political, legislative or policy spheres." Id. at 1030.
94
S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 178, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7186, 7314-15.
95
421 u .s. 560 (1975).
96
/d. at 567.
97
A.P.A. § lO(e)(B)(I), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). See also Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966); De Vito v. Shultz, 300 F.
Supp. 381, 383 (D.D.C. 1969).
98
387 U.S. at 14 n.2, citing H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946).
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Even if pre-enforcement judicial review is not precluded, courts may
refrain from examining the Treasury's pre-enforcement actions if they
find that the controversy is not yet ripe for judicial evaluation. 99 In Abbott, once reviewability was established, the court required the challenger
to show that he would suffer hardship if pre-enforcement review were denied and that judicial resolution of the issues was appropriate at that
time. 10 ° Companion cases to Abbott 101 concerning pre-enforcement challenges of FDA action further demonstrate that the doctrine of "ripeness"
is a barrier to initiating judicial review separate from the problem of reviewability.
There are three elements that must be balanced in deciding whether a
controversy is ripe for judicial review: fitness of issues for judicial resolution, hardship to the parties resulting from deferral of review until enforcement occurs, and finality of the agency action. 102 The issue of fitness
pertains not to the declaration of the rights of individual parties but to the
administration of the judicial process and the proper separation of powers.103 Consequently, the decision as to pre-enforcement review may tum
on whether the issues brought before the court are strictly legal, thus implicating questions of the relationship between the coordinate branches of
government, or are interwoven with factual disputes concerning the rights
of individuals. In Abbott, the Supreme Court found the issue fit for judicial resolution because inter alia the parties agreed that the issue was
"purely legal." 104 The TPM, if challenged on pre-enforcement review,
presents both legal and factual issues: whether the trigger mechanism may
properly be limited to the specified categories of raw steel mill products,
whether calculation of the trigger prices themselves was properly made,
and whether the Treasury exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the TPM. 105

••vining, Direct Judicial Review and The Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69
L. REV. 1443, 1495 (1%9). Professor Vining charitably described the doctrine as an
"anomaly" and "curiously atavistic." Id.
100
387 U.S. at 148-49. As described by the Court, the basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine is to prevent courts from becoming entangled in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and to protect agencies from judicial interference until "an administrative
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Id.
101
In Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967) [Toilet Goods I] and Gardner v.
Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967) [Toilet Goods II], the Court applied the doctrine of
ripeness in cases where judicial review of FDA action was clearly authorized. In Toilet
Goods I, pre-enforcement review of an FDA regulation was held inappropriate because the
challenged regulations did not affect the primary conduct of petitioners and only minimal
adverse consequences would occur if review were delayed until after enforcement. 387 U.S.
at 164-66. In Toilet Goods II, the same Court compelled pre-enforcement review because the
petitioner would risk criminal charges, seizure of the goods, or injunctions by' challenging
the regulations after enforcement. 387 U.S. at 172. See Vining, supra note 99, at 1499-1500.
102
National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
03
' ld. at 695.
104
387 U.S. at 149.
100
See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal, Civil Action No.78-0421, (D.D.C. 1978) [hereMICH.
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Potential challengers face a lesser barrier in proving that hardship to the
parties is caused by deferring judicial consideration of the TPM until the
Treasury takes enforcement actions . 106 Both domestic steel fabricators
and foreign producers of raw steel will suffer injury from the imposition of
the TPM as a consequence of the "minimum price" effects of the system.107 Once the trigger prices are published, foreign steel enterprises will
raise their prices in conformity with the triggers and domestic fabricators
who rely on foreign-produced raw steel will face an immediate rise in their
raw material costs. Moreover, confronted with the possibility of strict enforcement of the Antidumping Act in raw steel products, foreign steelmakers may shift from raw steel production to fabrication, which is not
covered by the TPM. Domestic fabricators consequently will face increased competition from foreign fabricators, some of whom may sell fabricated steel at a price below the cost of producing the raw steel involved.
Domestic steelmakers may also be injured if the trigger prices are set too
low, thus allowing foreign steel to be sold at prices American manufacturers cannot match. Hardship in all of these cases to a proper party
seems evident.
Finality is properly the last of the three elements which must be balanced to determine ripeness. The APA provides for judicial review of "final agency action. " 108 The term "agency action" includes within its statutory definition "an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy. " 109 The TPM should be treated as a final agency action, because
steelmakers are encouraged to rely on the trigger prices in the course of
business planning, 110 and the TPM is plainly an agency statement designed to implement both law and policy within the meaning of the APA.
Considered solely as a means of spurring an antidumping investigation,
the TPM may not appear to be a final agency action, as producers are affected only when the Treasury Department reaches a Tentative Determination of LTFV sales. This argument, however, ignores the significant
economic effects on domestic steel fabricators and on both foreign and
domestic steelmakers caused by the introduction of the TPM. Finality

inafter cited as Memorandum], and Tarnished Shield: 'Trigger-Price' System to Help Steel
Industry Triggers Much Dismay, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1978, at I, col. 6.
00
• Granting review on the basis of hardship is supported by the APA provision permitting
review of final agency actions for which there is no other adequate remedy,§ IO(c), 5 U .S.C.
§ 704 (1976). National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d at 696.
The test focuses on hardship to particular challengers and not on systemic effects. Vining,
supra note 99, at 1503-04. Imposition of the TPM will both have general systemic effects and
also place particular producers at an economic disadvantage prior to enforcement. Consequently, the defects in the calculation of costs which Vining discerns in Abbott and both
Toilet Goods cases are not present here. See Vining, supra note 99, at 1501-04.
107
See notes 122-130 and accompanying text infra.
106
A.P.A. § IO(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976).
0
• •Section 2(g) of the A.P.A., 5 U .S.C. § 551(13) (1976) defines "agency action" to iriclµde
the whole or part of an agency rule. "Rule" is further defined by§ 2(c) of the APA, 5 U .S.C.
§ 551(4) as "the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy."
110
See Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 5.
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should be judged by the practical effects ofagency action, notjust by the
direct effects on individual parties of enforcement activities. 111 In National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, the court held
that a letter sent by the Administrator of the Wage-Hour Division in the
Department of Labor in reply to a question by a trade association about
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act was final agency action entitling the trade association to judicial review. The court stated that the Supreme Court ''has found final action in a wide array of pronouncements
and communications having the contemplation and likely consequence of
'expected conformity. "' 112 "Expected conformity" in steel pricing is an
explicit goal in the Treasury's creation of the trigger system, so the TPM
should be considered a final agency action.
The issue of review ability is further complicated by a question of jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction of the United States District Courts involving customs matters, including antidumping duties, must be established
under 28 U.S.C. § 1340. That section provides for jurisdiction of "any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing for ... revenue
from imports or tonnage except matters within the jurisdiction of the Customs Court" (emphasis supplied). The Customs Court, under 28 U .S.C.
§ 1582(a), has "exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions instituted by any
person whose protest pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, has
been denied, in whole or part .... '' Such protests are governed by section 516 of the Antidumping Act, as amended, 113 which applies exclusively to challenges of appraised value, classification or the proper rate of
duty imposed pursuant to the Antidumping Act, and challenges of an
L TFV determination. 114
In National Milk Producers Federation v. Shultz, 115 a federal district
court, rather than the Customs Court, was found to have jurisdiction
where the plaintiff was suing to force the Treasury Department to impose
countervailing duties on imported dairy products pursuant to section 303
of the Tariff Act of 1930. The complaint alleged that the Department had
refused for six years to enforce the statute against EC dairy producers.
After construing Hammond Lead to deny the Customs Court jurisdiction
to hear protests by American manufacturers under section 1582, the district court in National Milk Producers Federation held that section 1340
conferred jurisdiction on the district courts.11 6 The.court rejected the defendant's argument that the court in Hammond Lead had merely held
countervailing duty protests to be unauthorized by section 516 and had
not barred Customs Court jurisdiction. The district court stated that the
unavailability ofreview under section 516 necessarily eliminated Customs

111 The issue of finality is to be determined "in a pragmatic way." National Automatic
Laundiy and Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
112
/d. at 698.
113 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
114
19 U.S.C. §§ 1516(a), (c), and (d) (Supp. V 1975).
11 •372 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1974).
116
/d. at 747.
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Courtjurisdiction under section 1582, "since that statutory provision unequivocally predicates jurisdiction on the existence of protests under the
1930 Tariff Act." 11 7
This conclusion is important in the context of pre-enforcement review
of the TPM. One of the principal maxims of customs practice is that the
Customs Court is without equity jurisdiction. 118 Thus, any declaratory or
injunctive relief against imposition of the trigger price system can only
come from federal district courts. This principle of jurisdiction was confirmed in Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 119 where the unavailability of
Customs Court jurisdiction to review challenges to trade agreements
negotiated between the United States, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China, was held to confer jurisdiction on the District Court for
the Eastern District of New York. 120 Because relief under section 516 is
unavailable to parties challenging institution of the TPM, the Customs
Court is divested of exclusive jurisdiction under section 1582 and such
challenges may be considered by district courts with the power to grant
adequate relief.

v.

EFFECTS OF THE TPM AND ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES

The trigger price system is designed to leave untouched the statutory
rights of all parties under the Antidumping Act. 121 Thus, a foreign steel
producer selling in the United States below the applicable trigger price
may challenge the Treasury's conclusion that sales are at "less than fair
value." However, the protection afforded by this right may be illusory in
practice. Trigger prices will be based on the best evidence available,
which is the type of evidence required by the statutory enforcement provisions .122 Consequently, the data used for antidumping investigations
triggered through the TPM may well be the same data used in establishing
the trigger. Indeed, the Solomon Report claim that the TPM will expedite
antidumping investigations is founded on the advantage to be derived
from the application of continually collected information on foreign and
domestic steel production to LTFV determinations. 123 The trigger price
will consequently reappear during the LTFV investigation as the legal

117/d.
11
"Vance, Proposed Legislation-Equity Power for the Customs Court, in THIRD ANNUAL
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS, May IO, 1976, 72 F.R.D. 239, 381, at 382 (1976).
119
566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 19n).
120
/d. at 399-401. See also Timken Co. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 221, 225-27 (D.C. Cir.
1976)(holding that the United States District Courts have jurisdiction over antidumping
complaints where Customs Court jurisdiction is unavailable).
121
See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
122
Compare Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 14 with 19 U.S.C. § 165 (1970).
123
See Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 16.
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standard for "fair value," 124 and will therefore set an effective minimum
price for imports entering the United States steel market. 125
The imposition of effective minimum prices for steel imports compels
foreign producers to act as a steel export cartel. 126 Because the triggers
are set at average cost rather than marginal cost, foreign producers who
otherwise would have charged lower prices will expropriate monopoly
profits on sales. 127 Moreover, a system which sets de facto minimum
prices will protect inefficient foreign producers from competition for the
import market. 128 The TPM prices are calculated from the average costs
of production for the most efficient foreign steelmakers, currently the
Japanese. As a result, an efficient Japanese firm may not sell in the United
States market below its average total cost of production without violating
the trigger price system even where marginal cost pricing would dictate a
lower price. Less efficient producers, such as the EC steelmakers who
sell at a higher price than the Japanese concerns even while dumping, may
continue to sell below their average total costs of production. Because the
Treasury will not initiate an antidumping investigation unless such sales
are below the relevant trigger, 129 less efficient producers may escape additional duties despite their continued dumping. In addition, the higher
prices charged by efficient producers to escape antidumping penalties will
permit less efficient producers to capture a larger share of the import
market due to the decrease in price differentials. The TPM therefore reallocates economic advantage among foreign producers.
To counter the adverse impact of the TPM, the most efficient foreign
steel producers may concentrate on exporting fabricated steel products
and reduce their exports of raw steel. 13° Fabricated steel products are
outside the purview of the trigger price system, and enforcement of the
Antidumping Act against such products when their prices do not fully incorporate production costs must proceed under the existing statutory re-

24
'
See 43 Fed. Reg. 2031 (Jan. 13, 1978) (Dept. of the Treasury, Welded Stainless Steel
Pipe and Tubing from Japan: Antidumping-Withholding of Appraisment Notice and Exclusion from Antidumping Investigation).
' 25 See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 559-63. While the FTC Staff Report considers
only legally enforceable minimum prices, use of the same standard of' 'fair value'' in L TFV
determinations and the prospect of strict enforcement in steel cases combine to set a reference standard equivalent in economic effect to a de jure minimum price. See Memorandum,
supra note 105, at 16-17. Cf. Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (order invalid for
failure to meet rate-making procedures where stating rates based on newly promulgated
formula would be acceptable but rates not conforming to the new formula would be suspended and investigated).
126
FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 560.
127 "To the extent that the Treasury price exceeds what the exporter would have charged,
the exporter appropriates the higher profits on its sales." Id.
128 Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 18.
129/d. See also Hearings, supra note 5, at 229 (testimony of Robert H. Mundheim, General
Counsel, Department of the Treasury), and the discussion of the Treasury's antidumping
investigation of Western European steel in note 67 supra.
130Hearings, supra note 5, at 187 (testimony of John H. Lyons, General President, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers); The Opposition
Grows to Reference Pricing, Bus. WEEK, April 10, 1978, at 30.
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gime and cannot share in the administrative advantages of the TPM.
Domestic fabricators will therefore be twice disadvantaged by imposition
of the TPM; those fabricators who rely on foreign produced raw steel will
pay more for their supplies, and all domestic fabricators will face increased competition due to the shift in production towards fabrication by
foreign steel makers responding to the TPM.
As the previous discussion demonstrates, establishing the TPM as a
procedural system for prosecution effectively reallocates economic opportunities among the interested parties even before enforcement. 131
There are two other alternative procedures for controlling imports that
the Administration could have used, each of which would allocate
economic opportunity differently. The first alternative was the imposition
of quantitative restrictions on the importation of foreign steel. 132 Quantitative restrictions may arguably be imposed unilaterally by the United
States consistent with its responsibilities under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).1 33 Although quantitative restrictions are generally outlawed by the GA TT, 134 they may be applied for national security
reasons 135 or after receipt of a waiver by the GATT.1 36 Additionally, the
GATT "escape clause" provisions may authorize such import restraints

131
See Transcript of White House Briefing by Anthony M. Solomon, Under Secretary of
the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, at 5 (Dec. 6, J9TI). One domestic fabricator dependent
on foreign-produced raw steel has alleged a 30% increase in its costs for imported steel since
the system has gone into effect, but before enforcement actions have been brought by the
Treasury. Bus. WEEK, April 10, 1978, at 30. See also Steel Heads for a Comeback, Bus.
WEEK, April 10,1978 at 30, 31, and Memorandum, supra note 105, at 16-17, 43-44, alleging
that foreign steel producers immediately upon promulgation of the TPM have refused to sell
below the relevant trigger, and that the plaintiff fabricator in that case will pay approximately $700,000 more during the second quarter of 1978 as a consequence.
132
Quantitative restrictions may be imposed unilaterally under U.S. law pursuant to the
"escape clause" provision of the 1974 Trade Act,§§ 201-203, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253
(Supp. V 1975). Under these procedures, presidential institution of quantitative restraints
must be preceded by a finding of the International Trade Commission (ITC) that "an article
is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial
cause of serious injury, or the treat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article
like or directly competitive with the imported article." See §§ 20J(b)(l), 202(c), and
203(a)(3), 19 U.S.C. §§ 225 J(b)(l), 2252(c), and 2253(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975). A similar procedure is required for the negotiation of Orderly Marketing Agreements with foreign countries
limiting imports. § 203(a)(4), 19 U .S.C. § 2253(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975). Whether negotiation by
the U.S. of a Voluntary Restraint Agreement directly with a foreign producer may be undertaken outside the framework of the escape clause is an open question. See J. JACKSON,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 676-78 (1977). For an example of a Voluntary Restraint Agreement, see Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger,
506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Presidential action under the escape clause is open to congressional veto in the form of a concurrent resolution if it differs in any respect from ITC
recommendations. The effect of such congressional action is to establish the ITC recommendation as the chosen form of import relief.§§ 203(b) and (c), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2253(b) and
(c) (Supp. V 1975).
133 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, date done October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. parts 5
& 6, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GA TT]. For a current listing of all
GAIT protocols and agreements, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT.
888-97 (1969).
134 GA TT, supra note 133, at art. XI.
135 /d. at art. XX!.
136/d. at art. XXV(5).
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where unforeseen developments and the effect of obligations incurred
under the GATT together cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers . 137
Quantitative restraints also may be imposed through voluntary agreements restricting imports. These agreements, often motivated by the
threat of unilateral actions, are known as Orderly Marketing Agreements
or Voluntary Restraint Agreements. 138 Such mutual accommodations are,
however, prohibited by the GATT limitations on export controls. Even if
the imposition of quantitative restrictions does not violate the GA TT,
foreign countries are authorized to take retaliatory trade action where adversely affected. 139
Quantitative restrictions effectively create, as do minimum prices, a
steel export cartel and thus generate monopoly profits. As a party to the
international agreements creating voluntary trade restraints, the United
States has some flexibility in determining who will capture these profits,
but foreign concerns rather than the Treasury are in practice the usual
beneficiaries. Moreover, the possible benefits from government allocation of these monopoly profits seem to be outweighed by the costs of potential retaliatory trade action by other countries. In addition, quantitative restraints completely break the link between domestic and world steel
prices, and allow inefficient foreign domestic producers to retain their
share of the market. 14° Finally, domestic fabricators face the same twopronged attack on their market when quantitative restraints are imposed
as they presently confront under the TPM regime. 141
The second alternative means of controlling steel imports would have
been the introduction of increased tariff rates on foreign steel products. 142
Because most tariffs in the United States are imposed ad valorem, an increased rate does not affect the competitive position of foreign producers
in the steel import market. In consequence, the levy of a tariff increase
would not serve to protect less efficient Western European steel concerns
in price competition with the more efficient Japanese steelmakers for the
American import market. A steel export cartel is not created, and the revenues generated by the tariff increase can be captured by the United
States Treasury. 143 Fabricators, however, once again remain outside the

137

/d. at art. XIX.
See note 132 supra.

138

139 Retaliation for action taken under the aegis of the GAIT escape clause, art. XIX, may
take the form of suspension of substantially equivalent trade concessions and obligations or,
in special cas.es, suspension of such concessions or obligations as may be necessary to prevent or remedy injury. Id. at art. XIX(3). Retaliation for actions which contravene the
GAIT, or impair or nullify obligations incurred under the GAIT, must be authorized by the
Contracting Parties to the GA IT.
140See generally Bell, Analysis of Protective Measures, in I COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 421, 431-34 (1971) and Metzger,hefu,y and Market
Disruption From Impons, in id. 167, 168-73 (1971).
141 See text following note 130 supra.
142 Tariff increases in these circumstances must meet the requirements of United States
law discussed in note 132 supra.
143See Stem, Tariffs and Other Measures of Trade Control: A Survey of Recent Develop-
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protective barrier erected by the increased tariff.
Increases in existing tariff rates, to avoid U.S. violation of the GAIT,
must come within the same escape clause, waiver, or national security
provisions as quantitative restrictions. 144 Retaliatory trade action by
foreign countries is thus a possibility to be considered by decisionmakers.
Consequently, a tariff increase, while less destructive to competitive
equilibrium than the TPM, shares with quantitative import restraints the
problem of international trade retaliation. Because the trigger system is,
at least in form, mereJy an administrative device for managing investigation resources, amounting to stricter enforcement of existing law, it does
not touch off retaliatory action by foreign states under the GA TT. In addition, the TPM is less likely to be seen by foreign states as a protectionist
measure than either quantitative restrictions or increased tariffs. These
considerations provide a strong incentive to use the TPM as the principal
component of the Administration response to the current steel crisis.
Since the TPM involves self-initiated limitation of administrative discretion, the Administration's policy choice may be perceived as circumventing "the checks and balances of both the U.S. Congress and the international negotiations for trade liberalization. " 145 Judicial inquiry into
the TPM may not be based on the GATT, 146 because the TPM is not
within the legal jurisdiction of the Agreement. Further, the TPM may be
insulated from judicial review entirely, as discussed earlier. Of course, as
an important element of the U.S. regulatory scheme for steel imports, the
TPM clearly comes within the purview of multilateral trade negotiations
proceeding under the auspices of the GA TT. Consequently, the system is
sure to receive international scrutiny during these ongoing negotiations.
The issue of congressional accountability raises a more substantial
question. Both quantitative restrictions and increased tariffs would in all
probability be exposed to congressional scrutiny under section 203 of the
1974 Trade Act, which empowers Congress to veto presidential actions to
provide import relief. 147 Section 203, part of the escape clause provisions
of the Trade Act, is applicable only where tariffs, quotas, and other import restraints are at issue. 148 The TPM, because it does not implicate
legal rights and is a procedural response to the steel problem, is not sub-

ments, 11 J. ECON. LIT. 589 (1973).
144
See notes 134-139 supra.
145
FfC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 560.
146
A GATI working party which examined the issue concluded that reference prices are
not covered by art. XVI of the GATI as an indirect subsidy to domestic industry. GATI,
BASIC INsrRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 188, 191 (9th Supp. 1961). See J.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATI 385-86 (1969).
147
Under § 203 of the 1974 Trade Act, 19 U .S.C. § 2253 (Supp. V 1975), if the President
recommends import relief which differs from the ITC recommendations under§ 201(d)(l),
19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(l) (Supp. V 1975), he must state the reasons for such differences in a
document transmitted to Congress. §§ 203(b)(I) and (b)(2), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2253(b)(l) and
(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). The recommendations of the ITC, rather than those of the President,
will take effect if both Houses of Congress within a ninety day period adopt a concurrent
resolution disapproving the presidential determination.§ 203(c)(l), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(l)
(Supp. V 1975).
148
1974 Trade Act, § 203(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (Supp. V 1975).
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ject to section 203 inquiry. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the elements which enter into the Treasury Department's balance between discretion and rule, in the absence of direct congressional accountability and
the possible absence of judicial review.
VJ.

DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Administrative discretion exists when an agency is free to make a
choice among possible courses of action, including the choice to do nothing at all. 149 The trigger price system identifies those cases in which the
Treasury Department will do nothing to investigate alleged violations of
the law. Having concluded that the Treasury is not legally accountable to
Congress nor perhaps to the courts for its failure to investigate, the essential fairness of enforcement of the Antidumping Act can be ensured only
by other means of checking arbitrary and unjust exercise of the Treasury's discretion. 150
Where there are no rules governing agency discretion, agency decisions
are often the result of conflicting political and economic forces. 151 The
promulgation of the TPM, while exempted from APA procedures on
rulemaking, is in effect the promulgation of rules structuring investigatory
discretion. These rules, guided by the policy of restricting antidumping
investigations to cases where the sale price of a raw steel product is below
the cost of production by the most efficient steelmakers, 152 are displayed
and are to be revised publicly. Consequently, the most important instruments identified by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, a well-known proponent of circumscribing official discretion, as essential in controlling discretionary authority 153 are employed in the construction of the trigger
price system. However, in the absence ofa showing that such devices are
effective, the mere existence of these instruments of control does not
guarantee adequate regulation of Treasury discretion.

149

DAVIS, supra note 70, at 4.
Discretion, and particularly selective enforcement, is integral to the effective functioning of administrative agencies. However, because the bulk of administrative activity is either
judicially unreviewable or judicially unreviewed, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TEXT 88 (3d ed. 1972), this power may be exercised in an arbitrary and unjust manner.
Courts have devised tools for the judicial structuring and control of this descretion, see K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 607 (1976), but much government activity
is still uncontrolled by the courts. Consequently, legislative oversight, interest group input,
and political accountability must be considered as means of controlling discretion. This article will not attempt to identify the effect of relying on institutions other than the judiciary for
control of administrative discretion. It is clear, however, that such institutions will structure
discretionary authority in line with their own interests. See T. Lowt, THE END OF
. LIBERALISM (1969).
151
Wright, Review: Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L. J. 575, 577 (1972).
52
'
See Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 18.
153
Davis has identified several instruments for the purpose of controlling the exercise of
discretionary authority: open plans, open policy statements, open roles, open findings, open
precedent, and fair informal procedures. DAVIS, supra note 70, at 99-120.
150
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At the present time, there has been little enforcement of the Antidumping Act in steel cases by means of the TPM. 154 Therefore, evidence of
control over the exercise of discretion by the Treasury must be garnered
by examining the events leading up to institution of the trigger system.
Executive action to assist the steel industry was prompted in 1977 by
strong congressional pressures, by the combined efforts of labor and the
industry to focus national attention on the problems of steel, and by the
filing of nineteen antidumping cases by the steel industry . 155 The principal
criticisms of the existing scheme for enforcing the Antidumping Act were
delay, product specificity and abuse of discretion, 156 and the TPM was
constructed to remedy these problems. In designing the TPM around the
cost of production standard, the Task Force accepted specific industry
claims that domestic steel concerns were fully competitive in the absence
of below-cost sales by foreign steel producers. Following publication of
the Solomon Report, Administration witnesses appeared at congressional
hearings to discuss and explain the proposed solutions.1 57 These events,
taken together, evidence both political and interest group input into the
process of establishing the TPM.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

The TPM was advanced by the Solomon Report as a response to the
current steel crisis. Because the system involves self-initiated restraint of
administrative discretion, the availability of pre-enforcement judicial review is problematic. While the legislative history of the 1974 Trade Act
and the language of section 516 argue against reviewability of the TPM,
the standard for prohibiting review established in Abbott is so strict that a
court may review the trigger system if it is alleged to constitute an abuse
of discretion.
In its construction of the TPM, the Treasury Department was apparently subject to political and interest group checks against the institution
154
See Memorandum, supra note 105, for material filed as part of a civil action brought by
a steel fabrication company, Davis Walker (:orp., against the Secretary of the Treasury. On
the basis of the complaint in that case, the U.S. district court issued a temporary order barring the Treasury from enforcing trigger prices on wire rod. Bus. WEEK, April 10, 1978 at 30.
The complaint brought by Davis Walker Corp. alleged that establishment of the TPM exceeded the Treasury's statutory authority under the Antidumping Act. It further claimed
that the TPM failed to comply with the rulemaking procedures of the APA and was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with Jaw, within the
meaning of 5 U .S.C. § 706," in publishing trigger prices for steel wire rod where (i) no other
semi-finished steel products are included in the system, (ii) no trigger prices are imposed on
any finished steel products, and (iii) the inclusion of steel wire rod in the TPM will not accomplish the purpose of the Antidumping Act where domestic steel production capacity is
inadequate to supply the domestic market for steel wire. See Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal, Civil Action No. 78-042 (D.D.C.
1978).
155
N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 19n at 51, col. 4.
158
See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
157
See Hearings, supra note 5.
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of potentially arbitrary discretion in steel antidumping actions. If judicial
review is unavailable, however, steps should be taken to ensure direct
congressional accountability. Moreover, because the level at which the
trigger price is set determines the effectiveness of the system, there
should be public participation in construction of the methodology used in
establishing the actual prices. By instituting the TPM, which is essentially
nothing more than open policy and procedure for initiating investigations,
the Treasury has begun the process of establishing accountability in the
administration of the antidumping laws. 158 Whether the Treasury will
continue in this direction remains to be seen.
-Mark Alan Kantor

158

Cf. Wright, supra note 151, at 578-79.

ERRATA
The following corrections should be made in Volume 11, Issue 1 :
Page 90. The last line of text should read:
"eliminating the abuses which have been disclosed in recent months."
Page 116. The first paragraph of text should read:
''Courts adopting the modern majority position have differed over
whether the Tucker Act supplements, displaces, or provides an alternative to the theories of recoupment and set-off. 48 A few older decisions
held that the $10,000 limit of the Tucker Act applies to counterclaims for
recoupment or set-off. Such an interpretation denies the district courts
jurisdiction over a valid counterclaim in excess of $10,000 when the defendant could otherwise recoup or set-off a claim regardless of the
amount."
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